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A Different Kind of Rigor: 
What Climate Scientists Can Learn From Emergency Room Doctors1 
 
Kent A. Peacock 





James Hansen and others have argued that climate scientists are often reluctant to speak out 
about extreme outcomes of anthropogenic carbonization.  According to Hansen, such reticence 
lessens the chance of effective responses to these threats.  With the collapse of the West 
Antarctic Ice Sheet (WAIS) as a case study, reasons for scientific reticence are reviewed.  The 
challenges faced by scientists in finding the right balance between reticence and speaking out are 
both ethical and methodological.  Scientists need a framework within which to find this balance.  




                                                 
1 This paper is forthcoming in Ethics, Policy, and Environment.  (The paper was accepted on June 26, 2017.)   
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1.   Introduction 
Climate scientists are frequently accused of alarmism, but in fact there is evidence that scientists 
often exhibit what James Hansen has called reticence — an unwillingness to err on the side of 
predicting extreme outcomes or recommending strong action to prevent those outcomes (Hansen, 
2007; Risbey, 2008).  Recently, Kevin Anderson claimed that many climate scientists are 
“ultimately choosing to censor their own research” — research which shows that the widely-
touted target of limiting global warming to a 2°C “guardrail” cannot possibly be met without a 
far more drastic restructuring of humanity’s means of generating energy than is politically 
palatable today (Anderson, 2015).  Brysse et al. document a systematic tendency among 
scientists to “err on the side of least drama” when considering the possible effect of global 
warming, and suggest that such caution may be part of the culture of science (Brysse, Oreskes, 
O'Reilly, & Oppenheimer, 2013).   
Despite the imminent risks of global warming, many scientists are conflicted about their 
obligation to inform the public of possible risks versus their perceived imperative to not publish 
a mistake, and some climate scientists have argued that it is not the business of research 
scientists to comment on policy (Edwards, 2013).  The urgency of the climate crisis (Hansen et 
al., 2013) is such that climate scientists need a clear ethical and methodological framework to 
guide their actions at this critical time.  This paper will review some preliminaries, and then 
argue that elements of such a framework can be found in the long-standing principles and 
practices of professional ethics.   
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2.   Case Study:  WAIS, the Restless Giant 
I will cite the threat of ice sheet collapse as a case study, because it has been specifically 
mentioned by Hansen and others (Hansen, 2007; Risbey, 2008; Brysse et al. 2013) as a critically 
important example of a possible outcome of global warming about which some scientists have 
arguably exhibited undue reticence, and because recent research in glaciology supports concern 
about the urgency of this problem (Favier et al., 2014; Greenbaum et al., 2015; Joughin & Alley, 
2011; Joughin, Smith, & Brooke, 2014; Pollard, DeConto, & Alley, 2015; Rignot, 2014, 
DeConto & Pollard, 2016).    
Paleoclimate evidence shows that sea levels during some earlier interglacials were 
several metres higher than they are now, even though temperatures were not much higher than at 
present.  Most of that extra interglacial water can only have come from the Greenland Ice Sheet 
(GIS) or the West Antarctic Ice Sheet (WAIS) (Hansen, Sato, Russell, & Pushker, 2013).  The 
stability of WAIS is a matter of particular concern.  It is not an ice sheet draped over a land mass 
(like much of GIS) but rather a grounded marine ice sheet or dome, a vast lens of ice packed into 
an abyssal trench in the sea floor and held in place by the colossal weight of its “ice over 
flotation.”  Over half of the ice in WAIS is concentrated in the Bentley Trench, which goes down 
to 2500 m below sea level.  The Trench is ringed by mountains and islands, with major outflow 
glaciers and ice streams connecting it to the sea.  Glaciologists have long been aware that 
grounded marine ice sheets such as WAIS are inherently unstable and possibly subject to rapid 
disintegration (Weertman, 1974; Hughes, 1977; Mercer, 1978).  WAIS in particular may be on a 
hair trigger, in part because of its relatively low ice over flotation compared to the major 
grounded ice sheets in East Antarctica.  There is increasing evidence that portions of the Eastern 
Page 4 of 36 
 
Antarctic Ice Sheet (EAIS) (Greenbaum et al., 2015; Pollard et al., 2015) will ultimately be 
susceptible to disintegration or even rapid collapse as well.   
The breakdown of a grounded ice sheet is presumably initiated by heat transport from 
warming ocean currents, but once a calving face has worked its way back into the interior basin 
of a marine ice sheet, rapid collapse may be inevitable for essentially mechanical reasons.  As T. 
Hughes warned, 
… a relatively minor climatic fluctuation along the ice shelf calving barrier can unleash 
glacial dynamic processes independent of climate that cause calving bays to 
remorselessly carve out the living heart of a marine ice sheet  (Hughes, 1977, p. 43). 
In 1978, J. Mercer (1978), a scientist who was arguably not guilty of reticence, warned of the 
risk of catastrophic collapse of WAIS should CO2 concentrations be allowed to rise unchecked: 
If the CO2 greenhouse effect is magnified at high latitudes, as now seems likely, 
deglaciation of West Antarctica would probably be the first disastrous result of continued 
fossil fuel consumption (Mercer, 1978, p. 325). 
Events in subsequent years have confirmed many of Mercer’s specific predictions (such as his 
warning that the ice shelves on the Antarctic Peninsula could collapse), and some recent studies 
show that under current conditions the ultimate disintegration of WAIS over a period of no more 
than a few centuries may be virtually inevitable (Joughin et al., 2014; Rignot, 2014).  However, 
it still remains unclear how long this process could take.  There is a genuine possibility, however 
remote, that the whole contents of the Bentley Trench could shatter in a matter of weeks or 
months, raising global mean sea level by 3 m or more almost immediately.  The South Asian 
tsunami of 2004 would pale in comparison to such a catastrophe, which would be both global in 
extent and irreversible over a multi-millennium time-scale. 
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 Ice sheet dynamics are complex and highly non-linear, and thus difficult to model or 
analyse with precision (Vaughn & Arthern, 2007).  The IPCC’s most recent predictions of sea-
level rise in Assessment Report 5 (AR5) did not take explicit account of dynamic ice sheet 
processes that could lead to rapid collapse (IPCC 2014, p. 16; Rahmstorf, 2013).  Generally, 
paleoclimate studies suggest that ice masses can collapse much more rapidly than allowed for by 
the models of ice sheet dynamics that were available to the authors of AR5.  Because of this 
conflict between modelling and paleoclimate data it did not seem possible to make sufficiently 
confident predictions about the possible future behavior of the ice caps as a function of various 
emission scenarios.  Recent models of ice sheet behavior come closer to replicating the potential 
for rapid collapse indicated by paleoclimate, because they take into account highly non-linear 
mechanisms (particularly ice cliff instability and hydrofracturing) that were not included in 
earlier modelling (DeConto & Pollard, 2016).  Finally, some scientifically-informed reporting on 
the risk of marine ice sheet collapse is beginning to appear outside the professional literature 
(Goodell, 2017; Betz, 2017).  But it is still not clear that an awareness of the risk of ice sheet 
collapse has entered the broad public discourse on climate, especially at the level of decision-
making.   
It may be that there is no significant risk of a collapse of WAIS until global mean 
temperatures get well above the nominal 2° C (above pre-industrial levels) that is currently 
accepted by international agreements as the threshold below which the risk of irreversible tipping 
points is deemed politically acceptable (UNFCCC, 2015).  However, there can be no guarantee 
that WAIS will be miraculously protected from the same mechanisms that destroyed other 
marine ice sheets in the past.  (See Hansen et al. 2016 for a critique of the adequacy of the 2° C 
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guardrail.)  Even if the probability of an imminent collapse of WAIS is low, this is surely a case 
where scientists should not choose to “err on the side of least drama” (Brysse et al., 2013).   
 
3.   The Dilemma 
There is no question that many scientists and others who heed the science have indeed chosen to 
speak out about the dangers of anthropogenic carbonization, sometimes at significant personal 
cost (Oreskes & Conway, 2010; Powell, 2011; Martin, 2014).  Michael Mann, one of the authors 
of the “hockey stick” paper (Mann, Bradley, & Hughes, 1998), states that he was at first 
convinced that any attempt to take a position on climate policy would “compromise the authority 
of my science,” but he eventually came to feel that 
there is nothing more noble than striving to communicate, in terms that are 
simultaneously accurate and accessible, the societal implications of our scientific 
knowledge.   (Mann 2012, p. 253) 
If scientists of good will are still unduly reticent (as claimed by Hansen, Anderson, and Brysse et 
al.), it is to an important extent because they are not sure when the need to speak out overrides 
the need to strive for the highest level of scientific certainty before claiming any sort of result.  
(There can also be non-scientific or even non-cognitive reasons for reticence, outlined below.)  
The problem is therefore methodological as well as ethical.  If it were possible for glaciologists 
to produce a timetable for the collapse of WAIS as a function of various emission scenarios then 
they could warn of these risks with much more confidence, and likely most would be inclined to 
do so.  However, the precise timing of a climatic catastrophe such as the collapse of a major ice 
sheet is inherently difficult or impossible to establish.  This is partially because such catastrophes 
may be triggered by the amplification (via various feedbacks) of small, unpredictable 
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fluctuations.  In this respect there is a similarity to the challenge of predicting earthquakes:  it 
may be much easier to identify the risk of a major quake in a certain region than to estimate its 
probability within a given time-frame (especially a relatively short time-frame).   
The difficulty with making predictions of climate catastrophes also arises to an important 
extent because the possible outcomes we are concerned with (such as the collapse of WAIS, an 
ice-free Arctic, or widespread oceanic anoxia) are unprecedented in human experience.  One of 
the few things that can be said with real confidence is that the probability of such events must 
increase with time, given our present understanding of the physics behind them and the 
paleoclimate record.   (In this respect there is a disanalogy with earthquakes, the probability of 
which is roughly constant over a long enough time scale.)  However, predicting ice sheet 
collapse is not like predicting heart attacks or trucking accidents, for which there are well-
established statistics.  How, then, are scientists to provide the advice that is so badly needed?  
And what sort of advice should they provide?   
 
4.   Some Principles of Disaster Prevention 
Without attempting to present a complete theory of disaster prevention, I will point to three 
principles that point to the kind of advice needed in the present crisis.   
 First, a “weak signal” is often the only warning we may have of an impending disaster 
(Gerstein & Ellsberg, 2008).  If the water suddenly recedes from a beach, run! ― don’t wait for 
confirmation or permission.  Action should be triggered by the reception of a signal that has a 
reasonable probability of being a sign of an impending catastrophe, even if in isolation from 
background information it looks like nothing more than an unremarkable oddity.  Some of the 
earliest warnings about anthropogenic carbonization came thirty or more years ago (Mercer 
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1978; Weart, 2014), when it was much more difficult to separate the global warming signal from 
the noise than it is now; these early warnings have proven to be accurate.    
 The second relevant principle of disaster prevention is not to attempt the usually 
impossible task of predicting the small fluctuations that can trigger a catastrophe, but rather to 
determine the range of parameters outside of which a complex system will be sensitive to small 
fluctuations.  Machines such as automobiles, if well designed and properly built, have a range of 
parameters within which they are very robust to perturbation, whereas outside that range even 
the best-designed machine may fail if subject to a perturbation that it could have easily withstood 
inside its envelope of safety.  Similarly, ecological and climatic systems tend to be self-
stabilizing within certain ranges (partially due to a variety of feedbacks) but unstable outside 
those ranges.  For example, as Hughes warned, once a marine ice sheet gets into a sufficiently 
vulnerable state, a local fluctuation could trigger a chain of catastrophic events with global 
consequences.  The goal, therefore, is not to attempt to predict each conceivable fluctuation 
(which is impossible anyway), but to predict the range of parameters (such as ocean current 
temperatures or the position of a glacial grounding line) within which fluctuations become 
dangerous.  That’s why I should buy new tires for my car when the old ones wear past a certain 
point, and that’s why one of the most important goals of climate science must be to identify the 
range of crucial parameters outside of which small fluctuations could trigger catastrophic 
outcomes.  Even if it is virtually impossible to predict the particular “black swan” (Taleb, 2010) 
fluctuation that triggers a catastrophe, it is often possible to predict the range of controlling 
parameters outside of which such fluctuations are likely to be important.   
 Finally, there is the old adage, “An ounce of prevention is worth a pound of cure” (Brysse 
et al., 2013).  If the ice dome in the Bentley Trench starts to blow apart, there is no conceivable 
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technology outside the realm of science fiction that could stop it.  But we still do not know that it 
will not be possible to prevent this catastrophe with a modest expenditure of a few hundred 
billion dollars on alternative energy technologies, if we start working on it soon enough.   
 
5.   Reasons (Good and Bad) for Reticence 
As Hansen remarks,  
…‘scientific reticence’…hinders communication with the public about dangers of global 
warming… Caution, if not reticence, has its merits. However, in a case such as ice sheet 
instability and sea level rise, there is a danger in excessive caution. We may rue reticence, 
if it serves to lock in future disasters (2007). 
It is worth reviewing some of the reasons why scientists may voluntarily choose to be reticent: 
1. A good reason:  In science it is very hard to be right, very easy to be wrong.  Scientists 
are understandably reluctant to publish a result or prediction unless they are virtually 
certain about it, or at least about the level of uncertainty they can attach to it.   
2. A not-so-good reason:  stubborn pride.  A notable historical example is the eminent 19th 
century mathematician Karl Friedrich Gauss.  His personal motto was pauca sed pura, 
“few but ripe” (Bell, 1937).  Gauss would not publish anything until it was polished to 
perfection, with the result that some of his important discoveries (such as non-Euclidean 
geometry) were scooped by younger and slightly less cautious mathematicians.  One 
would think that with the relentless pressure to publish faced by most scientists these 
days, Gaussian reticence would be rare.  However, it might be used as an excuse to 
withhold results that could be controversial or disconcerting.   
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3. A regrettable reason:  scientists may reasonably fear that they would lose funding if they 
pursue unorthodox topics or extreme case scenarios (J. E. Hansen, 2007).  Granting 
agencies have probably always tended to be risk-averse, but, as Lee Smolin points out 
(Smolin, 2006), it is increasingly difficult to get support for innovative research in 
today’s climate of budgetary restraint. There is, therefore, an incentive for scientists 
working in all fields (not only climate) to be cautious— even when their work does not 
threaten the continued profitability of a large sector of industry.   
4. A very regrettable reason:  scientists can become subject to personal attacks (Mann, 
2012; Powell, 2011) or risk the loss of their livelihoods; therefore  some, quite 
understandably, may choose to keep their heads low.    
5. Scientists working for government agencies are often prohibited from discussing their 
research or its policy implications, on pain of job loss or worse (Schindler, 2017). 
6. Fear of disapproval from colleagues, supervisors, or the scientific community (Brysse et 
al., 2013) is a key reason for scientific reticence as well, but this factor cuts both ways.  
Appropriate caution may increase a scientist’s reputation for reliability, but there are 
cases where advances have been hindered when a scientist bowed to the prejudices of his 
or her supervisor or other critics (Lindley, 2007, Ch. 8).   
Climate scientists may also be unconsciously hesitant to say what they know because of 
possible “seepage” into professional discourse of the often-poisonous atmosphere of climate 
science denialism (Lewandkowsky, Oreskes, Risbey, & Newell, 2015; Biddle & Leuschner, 
2015).   
Finally, there is the methodological challenge to which this paper draws particular 
attention:  Scientists lack clear guidelines for the relatively rare cases when pure scientific 
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research points to challenges of urgent public importance which may require a response under 
uncertainty. 
The “inconvenient truth” is that there are some possible outcomes (such as the collapse of 
WAIS) that are too important and too urgent to be reticent about, despite the scientific 
uncertainties surrounding them.  Scientists need an ethical and methodological framework that 
coheres with the scientific ethos but which could help them find the right balance between 
reticence and speaking out.  Oreskes (2013) has argued that scientists should be treated as 
sentinels, and Torcello (2011) argues that scientists have an obligation to inform public discourse 
in an unbiased way on the basis of Rawlsian ideals of public reason.  The approach I explore 
here is in the spirit of these suggestions but draws on the long-established model of professional 
ethics.  (R. Chadwick, 2005, has also argued, but from a different philosophical viewpoint, that 
scientists could be guided by the model of professional ethics.)  I claim that when it comes to 
possible outcomes that are both immediate and catastrophic, climate scientists should think more 
like emergency room doctors than medical researchers.  In the following I will explain what this 
would mean.   
 
6.   Main Points of Professional Ethics 
Although the legal details vary from one jurisdiction to another, certain key features of the 
learned professions are common throughout the industrialized world and have their basis in 
centuries of practice.  Notably, the legally constituted learned professions such as medicine and 
engineering are self-regulating, which means that it is professionals themselves who largely or 
entirely control accreditation and discipline.  The ancient rhetorical question — quis custodiet 
ipsos custodes? — expresses implicitly the uncomfortable fact that in the last analysis there is no 
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one to guard the guardians from impropriety but the guardians themselves; this is a major reason 
why codes of personal ethics must be integral to professional law.   
In the following I will refer mainly to engineering and medicine, but several other 
professions are constituted in ways very similar to that described here.   
The aspects of professionalism most relevant to our present discussion are these: 
1. Professionals have a duty to decide:  life and death decisions must be made in real time, 
often under conditions of uncertainty.    
2. Medical doctors and engineers have a duty to innovate if a problem demands it, but they 
must do this in a conservative way because experimentation is not allowed.      
3. Professional decisions are often required in cases where there is no algorithm.  Such 
cases require judgement, an ability to weigh the pros and cons of a complex problem and 
act decisively and creatively.     
4. Professionals must avoid negligence.  There is a higher onus placed upon them than upon 
members of the general public to go out of their way in their areas of competency to do 
those things would be right and necessary according to their professional judgement.   
5. Members of the learned professions have a duty to report (whistle-blow) and a duty to 
inform the public.  Under certain circumstances, the duty to report, which is legislated, 
over-ride duties to self, the client, or any vested interests.   
6. Professionals have a duty to self-educate, to maintain and expand their competence as 
required by the demands of their practice.   
7. It is presumed that professionals enjoy epistemic privilege within their fields of practice. 
This justifies the fact that practitioners are given certain clearly delineated legal powers 
that other citizens do not have.     
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8. Professionals must act in a way that is entirely impartial and free from conflict of interest.   
9. Public welfare is given highest priority, in a way that is guided by the precautionary 
principle (discussed below). 
I will now explain some of these points in more detail; see also (American College of Emergency 
Physicians, 2008; American Society of Civil Engineers (ASCE), 2006; Andrews & Kemper, 
1992; Engineering Council & Royal Academy of Engineering, 2014; Peacock & Shepherd, 
1998).   
 
6.1   Duty to Decide 
Consider what emergency room physicians have to do:  Their training has a basis in 
centuries of medical practice and the best science available, but they do not have the luxury of 
investigating a problem for an indefinite length of time.  The right decisions have to be made, 
often very quickly, with no room for trial-and-error.  The duty to decide therefore implies not a 
lessening of intellectual rigor but a different kind of rigor than that cultivated in pure research.  
(More on this below.) 
6.2   Duty to Innovate — Conservatively 
Experienced physicians or engineers are usually presented with problems that they have 
seen many times before.  However, occasionally they will be presented with a novel challenge, 
and it is above all else the expectation that they can cope with novelty that justifies their high 
economic and social status.   Thus, like research scientists, they work at the frontiers of 
knowledge and expertise.  Unlike research scientists, though, they cannot indulge in 
experimentation.  (Medical research may be combined with treatment, though only under very 
specific constraints.)  Engineers and physicians often engage in pure research, but when they are 
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working on a particular case, with lives at stake, they must get it right the first time.  Those who 
contemplate geoengineering (Broecker & Kunzig, 2008; Keith, 2013) need to keep these 
principles in mind.  It would not be surprising if geoengineering itself eventually were to become 
a recognized discipline within the engineering profession, as societies scramble to respond to 
climate change.   
6.3   The Essential Role of Good Judgement 
Professionals are trained in the application of a plethora of algorithms, but they must 
occasionally solve a problem, in low finite time, without the benefit of a full algorithm for that 
particular case.  Such cases require judgement in much the sense indicated by Aristotle 
(Nichomachean Ethics, in, e.g., McKeon 1941).  Good professional judgement is in the last 
analysis non-algorithmic and has an essentially aesthetic component.  Thoughtful people 
sometimes find this troubling, because they feel that medicine and engineering are the last places 
where one should rely on something that superficially looks like mere guesswork.  In fact, the 
kind of non-algorithmic judgement I speak of here can only be exercised by those with 
appropriate experience and training, and the need for it can never be entirely obviated regardless 
of what procedures, protocols, formulas, algorithms, or guidelines may be put in place.   
6.4   Avoidance of Negligence 
Professionals can face both civil and criminal penalties not only if they do the wrong 
thing, but if they fail to do the right thing.  However, the definition of negligence that is given in 
typical professional codes is frustratingly non-specific.  For instance, the engineering code for 
the Province of Ontario merely states that professional negligence is “an act or an omission in the 
carrying out of the work of a practitioner that constitutes a failure to maintain the standards that a 
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reasonable and prudent practitioner would maintain in the circumstances” (“Definition of 
Professional Misconduct; Ontario Regulation 538/84, Sect. 86,” 1990). 
Thus, what would constitute negligence in a particular case is to an important extent 
determined by case law, if there is precedent for the case at hand, but ultimately is a matter of the 
good judgement of the practitioner.  It is not possible to prescribe in advance, fully and precisely, 
a list of which acts would constitute negligence and which would not.  Engineers are liable if 
they get it wrong even though it is not always possible to tell them precisely what would 
constitute negligence in any particular case.  Could it be negligent to not speak out more 
forcefully and publicly about the possible dangers of sudden WAIS collapse?  Only glaciologists 
and other relevantly qualified scientists can answer that question, but there is no formula to tell 
them how to answer.   
6.5   Duty to Report 
Professionals are cautioned to not blow the whistle unless they have exhausted all normal 
channels of command and communication.  However, in extremis their duty to report over-rides 
all other considerations, including loyalty to their colleagues, employers, and clients — and their 
own job security.  This was explained bluntly by the Professional Engineers of Ontario: 
Engineers must act out of a sense of duty, with full knowledge of the effect of their 
actions, and accept responsibility for their judgment [in a way that is] open, personal, 
[and] conducted with the interest of the public in mind… [This] obviously requires that 
engineers put their names on the action and sometimes their jobs on the line (Anon., 
2010). 
What applies to professional engineers could be taken to apply to tenured academics as well, 
though in their case the duty to report is implicit rather than being explicitly enshrined in law.  
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Noam Chomsky famously stated that “it is the responsibility of intellectuals to speak the truth 
and to expose lies” (Chomsky, 1967).  Some intellectuals, including some scientists, are 
fortunate enough to enjoy the privilege of academic tenure, an institution which is intended to 
protect freedom of inquiry, expression, and criticism for the greater benefit of humanity.  Those 
of us with academic tenure therefore may well feel that we have a particularly strong obligation 
to blow whistles when the evidence demands it.   
6.6   Knowing One's Limitations 
Some will point out that I've forgotten to mention one important component of 
professional ethics:  practitioners have a duty to know the limits of their own competence and to 
not attempt to operate outside those limits.  Such a duty certainly does exist.  However, the main 
problem addressed in this paper is the fact that some scientists are reluctant to speak out 
regarding matters on which they are, indeed, competent.  If one’s scientific expertise about (say) 
ice sheet dynamics points to the need to comment on a matter such as (say) energy policy, then 
one may have a duty to self-educate so as to be able to speak with at least minimal competence 
in that area, or else cite or seek collaboration with other professionals who do have the requisite 
competencies.   
6.7   Epistemic Privilege 
The legal authority of the learned professions is underpinned by their epistemic privilege, 
which means that professionals are presumed to have access to knowledge that is not available to 
other members of society.  Suppose my friend Bloggs is walking along intently texting on his 
smart phone and does not notice that he is about to step off the curb into fast-moving traffic.  I’m 
standing close by.  There are many things about Bloggs that I am in no position to comment on 
unless invited by him to do so.  But I do happen to know one urgent matter of great importance 
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to him, a matter of which he is unaware.  My epistemic privilege, coupled with even the most 
minimal notions of ethics, both entitles and requires me to call out a warning to him or even to 
physically restrain him before he gets run over.  Similarly, while there are many matters on 
which climate scientists cannot be expected to be competent to provide advice, they do have very 
well-founded knowledge about certain matters of great urgency which most people are not in a 
position to understand.  From the point of view of professional ethics, it is entirely appropriate, 
and indeed it may be required, for them to speak out — even if there is an appreciable chance 
that they are wrong.   
There is, of course, no logical path from the bare fact that Bloggs is about to get run over 
to the normative claim that I ought to warn him.  It has been recognized by philosophers from 
Hume onward (Hume, 1751) that one cannot get an ‘ought’ from an ‘is’.  That is why my 
knowledge of Bloggs’ problem needs to be coupled with some notions, however minimal, of 
ethical obligation.  In this paper we need not explore the deep question of where such notions 
could come from, although it is worth noting that in codes of professional ethics they typically 
cash out in deontic form; that is, they are expressed as duties and expectations even if their 
philosophical basis might lie elsewhere.     
6.8   Freedom from Conflict of Interest 
Professionals are in a conflict of interest, or at least a perceived or potential conflict of 
interest, if they allow themselves to be caught in a situation in which it is possible for the 
objectivity of their professional judgement to be subverted by personal gain, advancement, or 
favouritism.  The very term “conflict of interest” suggests that one is serving more than one 
master.  Professional guidelines and codes invariably contain provisions to forestall conflicts of 
interest.  For instance, engineers and medical doctors are generally not permitted to provide 
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expert testimony in a court case for a contingent fee — that is, a fee that would depend upon the 
outcome of the case (American Medical Association (AMA), 2004; Bennet et al., 2012; 
International Board of Forensic Engineering Sciences (IBFES)).   
A common denialist trope is that climate scientists exaggerate the risks of CO2 emissions 
in order to trump up more research grants, or perhaps to garner publicity, prestige, or career 
advancement.  (See, e.g., Mann 2012, pp. 202–206.)  One of the mechanisms that protect 
scientists from such charges is the peer review system, which, though arguably imperfect in ways 
we need not explore here, is designed to maintain high epistemic standards and to ensure that 
publication, granting, and promotion depend only upon scientific merit.  Another key mechanism 
is the high value placed on independent replicability of claimed scientific results.   
While any number of legal, procedural, or methodological mechanisms can be put in 
place to protect the public from professional conflict of interest, professionals understand (or 
should understand) that their stock in trade is their personal intellectual integrity; this is the case 
for research scientists as well as registered professionals such as doctors or engineers.  Integrity 
is not only a matter of telling the truth when asked but also of speaking out when it is not 
ethically possible to do otherwise.  What does it mean to “tell the truth”?  The core of intellectual 
integrity in both the learned professions and research science is the presumption that judgements 
are advanced for cognitive reasons, not rhetorical reasons.  A professional judgement could, of 
course, be in error, but it is based on the best efforts of a highly-trained person to get it right on 
the basis of evidence and reasoning; it is not a sales pitch. 
6.9   The Precautionary Principle 
The ancient Hippocratic oath enjoined physicians to “do no harm,” but practitioners 
know that they must balance this with the imperative to take action when it would be 
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unconscionable not to (Harris, 1995).  Brysse et al. (2013) quote the highly apposite version of 
the Precautionary Principle given in the Rio Declaration of 1992: 
Where there are threats of serious or irreversible damage, lack of full scientific certainty 
shall not be used as a reason for postponing cost-effective measures to prevent 
environmental degradation. 
Nor should lack of full scientific certainty be an excuse for not speaking out about the risks of 
catastrophic events that do, in fact, have a reasonable probability of occurring. 
 One might ask why we could not use risk-benefit analysis rather than the seemingly less 
rigorous precautionary principle to plot the climate and energy policies that have the best chance 
of maximizing general utility.  One advantage of the Precautionary Principle is that it explicitly 
shifts the burden of proof onto the parties who would advocate for the course of action that is 
likely to lead to the most damaging outcomes (Mann & Toles 2016, p. 12).  But risk-benefit 
analysis has significant ethical and methodological weaknesses as well.  The ethical problem is 
that it can be difficult to carry out a risk-benefit analysis in a fair and impartial way, especially if 
the parties exposed to possible risks are not the same as the parties who may benefit from the 
course of action being analyzed (Shrader-Frechette, 1986).  The methodological problem is that 
climate change outcomes are not the sorts of things that are readily amenable to risk-benefit 
analysis in the first place.   
The latter point deserves some explanation.  In order to carry out a meaningful risk-
benefit analysis of a possible course of action, one needs to know three things:  all possible 
outcomes of that course of action that could affect utility, the utilities or disutilities of each 
possible outcome, and the probabilities (in the sense of long-run frequency) of each possible 
outcome.  Risk-benefit analysis can be useful, therefore, in assessing possible actions (such as 
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construction projects) that either have been done many times before, or are built up in 
unproblematic ways out of actions that have been done many times before.  Actuaries have 
compiled reliable statistics on the incidence of typical industrial accidents, for instance, so that 
the likely disutility of such accidents attendant upon a project can be readily calculated.   
One of the major methodological challenges posed by possible outcomes such as the 
rapid collapse of WAIS is that we are trying to estimate the probability of an event that has not 
occurred within recorded human history.  Paleoclimate data does provide some guidance about 
the conditions under which such events could occur and how rapidly they could occur, but for 
several obvious reasons it is not possible to estimate with any real confidence the probability that 
WAIS will collapse in, say, the next fifty years.  All that can be said with any approach to 
certainty is that humanity is presently engineering the physical conditions (such as the 
disintegration of ice shelves and warming of deep ocean currents) which, as far as we know, will 
increasingly tend to favour the eventual collapse of grounded marine ice sheets.   
It is also impossible to meaningfully predict the quantitative disutility of (say) a sudden 
three metre sea level rise caused by the collapse of a grounded ice sheet.  Would it merely 
produce 100 million refugees and the overnight loss of most coastal cities and an appreciable 
portion of the world’s agriculture, or would it trigger an escalating chain reaction of disasters that 
would lead to the complete collapse of technological civilization?  (See World Bank 2007 and 
Hansen et al. 2016 for some analysis of the possible impact of multi-metre sea level rise.)  All we 
can be sure of is that the consequences would be so bad that it is almost meaningless to assign a 
dollar value to them; as the popular saying has it, “we just don’t want to go there.”  We do not 
need an exercise in spurious numerical precision to know that we want to place a very high 
priority on whatever it takes to move the planet away from the physical conditions that could 
Page 21 of 36 
 
precipitate the collapse of WAIS.  And among other things this implies that scientists need to 
accept some intellectual risks and share, not only what they know, but what they strongly suspect 
to be relevant to this hugely important problem.   
6.10   Some Disanalogies between Research Science and the Learned Professions 
The analogies between research science and the learned professions are not perfect.  A 
major distinction is that professionals such as engineers are hired to do a specific job of work or 
to solve a specific problem, often for a specific client or patient.  Research science, on the other 
hand, is open-ended, exploratory, even when an area of research (such as, say, the molecular 
basis of cancer) is directed toward solving a particular class of problems.  The client is the public 
in the broadest sense, under the working assumption that the expansion of knowledge is in the 
interest of the long-range welfare of the human species.   
While there are admirable codes of scientific ethics (e.g., AGU, 2013a), scientific 
research is not a legally constituted profession such as medicine, law, or engineering, and its 
codes of ethics (explicit or implicit as they may be) are in general not legally enforceable.  By 
contrast, the ethical codes for the learned professions are usually part of the laws governing those 
professions; an engineer is legally required to behave ethically, at least in respect to his or her 
professional work.  Indeed, licensed professionals are in general required to accept a level of 
personal responsibility that would be supererogatory for non-professionals.   
Furthermore, research scientists do not enjoy the kind of legal protection that engineers or 
doctors enjoy (at least in theory) if they should find it necessary to blow a whistle.  This, of 
course, could be another reason why scientists may tend to be unduly reticent when the evidence 
would otherwise compel them to bring bad news.    
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One possible objection to the views of this paper might be to claim that there is a 
“disconnect” between research science and the learned professions, since the latter fields seem to 
have more “direct, immediate implications on individuals’ livelihoods” (as a referee put it) while 
pure science deals with matters which are both uncertain and remote.   
 To respond to this, it is essential to distinguish between the scale of a decision, and the 
type of a decision.  It is perfectly correct that medicine and engineering usually seem to have 
more direct bearing on our day-to-day lives than planetary-scale ecological research.  I am more 
likely to go to my doctor because I have a cough than because I seek advice on the survival of 
the species.  But what counts is the methodology that the physician must use.  Do I need cough 
syrup or radical surgery?  These are the sorts of sometimes-momentous decisions under 
uncertainty that medical professionals routinely have to make.  A prescription for cough syrup 
for one patient is more local than a prescription for a major change in energy policy, which could 
affect every person on the planet.  But the type of reasoning is essentially the same — a 
scientifically well-founded decision must be made under uncertainty, within a limited time 
frame, and driven by an ethical imperative.   
 Also, let us not forget that doctors and engineers obviously often do give advice with 
long-term and wide-ranging impact.  Doctors warn young people not to smoke, or they advise 
patients to alter their diets or get more exercise because of long-term benefits those changes will 
bring.  Medical professionals may make decisions, such as whether or not to vaccinate a 
population or to approve a new chemotherapy, which can affect millions of people.  Engineers 
often work on projects that have large implications for long-term public well-being, such as 
bridges, dams, or electricity distribution networks.  There is no real disconnect between the types 
of problems that doctors and engineers solve and the challenge that a glaciologist faces when 
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trying to decide when and how to speak out about the possible global risks of a major ice sheet 
collapse.  It’s just a question of scale, in terms of the number of people (patients) who may be 
affected or the spatial and temporal scale over which the decision may have its effects.  The 
commonality, again, is the methodology of decision-making.  
The medical example also underscores a key point that is implicit throughout this paper.  
Like medical doctors and engineers, scientists must not only diagnose a problem but prescribe 
possible solutions, or at least lend their competence to the formulation of such solutions.  Policy 
cannot be left to policy-makers alone any more than medical advice could be left entirely to 
those without medical training.   
Despite some important disanalogies, the learned professions offer an exemplar that 
climate and other scientists can voluntarily emulate when faced with the need to balance 
epistemic certainty with the need to warn the public about risks.  Through many centuries of  
practice the professions have evolved a set of clear ethical standards based upon responsibilities 
to the patient, client, and society at large, and a methodology that (while difficult to formalize or 
quantify) constitutes a long-tested, pragmatic means of balancing the need for epistemic certainty 
with the need to act or speak out decisively.   
6.11   The Upshot 
From the duties to decide and to report, it follows that in cases (such as the possible 
collapse of WAIS) where action is demanded by the precautionary principle, scientists who wish 
to emulate the professions must eschew reticence.  They must use their professional judgement 
to estimate risks and propose solutions even when reliable algorithms for doing those things do 
not exist.  And they must do this utterly without special favour — though it is perhaps too much 
to expect that, being human, they will always be able to do it entirely without fear.   
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7. A Different Kind of Rigor 
I do not recommending a lessening of the standards of scientific rigor any more than I 
recommend that scientists allow their advocacy for a position held for non-scientific reasons to 
bias their science.   Rather, I am arguing for a different kind of rigor — one that recognizes that 
the need for the highest possible epistemic certainty must sometimes be counterbalanced by the 
need for the best possible decisions to be made in finite time, with less-than-perfect resources of 
information.  This is the rigor that professionals in fields such as medicine and engineering have 
been required to aim at for centuries, and it can be very difficult to achieve.  It is far easier to 
withhold assent until one’s result is confirmed to seven standard deviations.  Indeed, it is 
reasonable to hold out for such near-Cartesian certainty in cases like the detection of the Higgs 
boson (Anthony, 2012).  Presumably the immediate fate of civilization does not depend upon 
whether this elementary particle exists, and it is only useful as a building block of scientific 
knowledge if its properties are confirmed with the highest accuracy that experimental technique 
will allow.  While many of the specifics of climate science, such as the claim that CO2 is a 
greenhouse gas, would be accepted by scientists as much more than 95% certain (Borenstein, 
2013), the IPCC allows for a certainty level as low as only 95% (“extremely likely”) for their 
conclusion that “human influence has been the dominant cause of the observed warming since 
the mid-20th century” (IPCC, 2014).  This is comparable to or exceeds the level of certainty with 
which medical practice must frequently content itself (see, e.g., Castillo, 2010).     
 The very notion of epistemic rigor has to have a different meaning when we discuss 
disaster prevention rather than the confirmation of scientific hypotheses.  A full analysis of 
scientific uncertainty is beyond the scope of this paper.  However, it is clear that the aim of 
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climate science with respect to the future of WAIS is not to confirm that this ice sheet will 
definitely collapse under certain circumstances — we do not want to test that claim — but rather 
to show how to avoid the parameter regimes in which that outcome is probable.  This implies 
that it will not always be possible to recommend preventative measures with absolute confidence 
that they will be relevant or effective.  Uncertainty is our constant companion in real-life 
decision-making, and as Lewandowsky et al. argue (Lewandowsky, Risbey, Smithson, Newell, 
& Hunter, 2014), it may be rational for uncertainty about high-risk outcomes to provide 
increased justification for pre-emptive action.  While we may not be certain of the probability of 
an outcome such as the collapse of WAIS, we may be certain that it is an outcome we wish to 
avoid.  Furthermore, if we aren’t sure of the probability of such an outcome, there is a chance 
that it is higher than we currently estimate.  Thus, if there is an appreciable possibility of that 
outcome, its uncertainty is all the more reason for striving to prevent it.   
 
8. The Challenge of Communication 
The major concern of this paper is whether or not to communicate a scientific result or its 
implications, not how to communicate it — how, that is, in the sense of finding effective 
techniques of communication and teaching.  But the difficulty of communicating complex and 
uncertain scientific concepts to the public is likely yet another reason in itself for undue scientific 
reticence, and something must be said about it here.    
 This paper has focussed mostly on the need to communicate extreme risks such as the 
collapse of major ice sheets.  Arguably this could increase the perception of climate scientists as 
alarmist.  Well, what if one is an alarmist?  It is irresponsible to cry “Fire!” in a crowded theatre 
if there is no fire; it is criminal to not call out a warning if there is (Torcello, 2017).   However, 
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this paper hardly means to suggest that scientists should only speak out in cases of extreme and 
immediate risk.  Scientists should certainly be better prepared and trained than they often are to 
enter the public discourse around a range of topics.  High risk issues are highlighted in this paper 
because those are the topics that are the most difficult on which to speak out.  No one is going to 
send a scientist a death threat for discussing the merits of string theory.  So scientists have the 
greatest need for clearer guidelines in the cases such as ice-sheet collapse where the challenges 
to speaking out are greatest.   
 S. H. Schneider made a now-classical argument for the need for his fellow climate 
scientists to communicate with the public:   
[T]hose of you who turn away from attempts to communicate honestly and effectively in 
public because it is not familiar or comfortable, are simply leaving the task to others — 
not all of whom will express your science in a way that you might approve of.  
(Schneider 1988, p. 115) 
There is evidence that the task of communication is not hopeless (Kocher et al., 2017), and 
behavioral studies of public response to science communication (such as Poortinga et al., 2011) 
could be a valuable resource.    However, one of the greatest barriers to climate science 
communication is the extreme politicization of much of the current discourse on climate and 
energy.  In an interview on November 23, 2016, Robert Walker, an advisor to then-President 
elect Trump stated,  
…some of the, at least, press statements coming out of those scientific investigations 
have more of a political feel than a scientific one.  Look, I'm not a bench scientist.  I'm a 
politician.  I know politics when I see it. (CBC Radio)   
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It is too easy to retort that Mr. Walker does not know science when he sees it.  But there is a 
more subtle problem here.  A scientific conclusion (such as a statement about the likelihood of 
ice sheet collapse) is advanced for scientific reasons.  However, scientific conclusions about 
climate and energy often have policy implications, sometimes quite obvious, sometimes not so 
obvious.  If medical tests show that I am prediabetic, it is a short step to appropriate advice about 
diet, exercise, or medication.  But no responsible doctor would say that I was prediabetic merely 
because he or she thought that more exercise would be good for me.  Similarly, the fact that 
certain findings in glaciology have policy implications does not mean that these findings were 
presented merely as rhetoric in order to advance those policies.  However, it might look that way 
to those who do not understand how science works, or who are politically motivated to mistrust 
the scientists.   As with medicine, so it is with earth science:  if people don’t like the advice, they 
are tempted to question the motives behind the diagnosis.   
Another major barrier to communicating the risks of climate change is cognitive 
distancing, the tendency to downplay the importance of eventualities such as catastrophic sea 
level rise that we (sometimes mistakenly) believe to lie comfortably far in the future or to be 
someone else’s problem.  Socrates (Protagoras, 356c–e; in, e.g., Hamilton & Cairns, 1961) 
likens this cognitive error to thinking that objects in the distance really are smaller than they are 
close by, and argues that our happiness depends upon learning to judge things by measurement, 
not appearances.  There is no question that the urgent can pre-empt the important — if my house 
catches fire I can’t devote any attention to global warming at that moment, even if the fire was 
caused by global warming.  However, a major task for non-reticent scientists is to communicate 
an accurate sense of perspective and scale, to show how (for example) paleoclimate is 
immediately relevant to policy decisions that must be made in the near-term.  One of the best 
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ways to overcome cognitive distancing (which is not only a cognitive error but a kind of denial 
or defense mechanism in itself) may be to show that the situation is not hopeless, that there are 
scientifically possible solutions to at least some of the ecological challenges that humanity 
currently faces (Jacobson & Delucchi, 2011). 
In recent years a number of climate and earth scientists have taken a cue from Schneider 
and tried (in many cases very hard) to communicate the urgency of our present climate crisis to 
the public and policy-makers.  (See, for instance, AGU 2013b.)  Despite these efforts, no climate 
scientist of whom I am aware is satisfied that they are doing a good enough job of 
communication; see, for instance, recent remarks by the distinguished glaciologist E. Rignot 
(2015).   
Science communication has a long history, going back at least as far as Galileo, who 
risked the rack to publish his highly accessible writings in the vernacular.  One of the most 
notable instances of scientists attempting to communicate urgent warnings to the public was the 
Russell-Einstein Manifesto of 1955.  The scientists who signed this document were speaking out 
about the dangers of nuclear conflagration.  Many of them felt a deep sense of personal 
responsibility since their work had helped make nuclear weapons possible.  Although the 
manifesto is about the risk of nuclear war, with one correction a key paragraph in it is a very 
accurate description of the climate crisis today: 
Many warnings have been uttered by eminent men [and women] of science and by 
authorities in military strategy. None of them will say that the worst results are certain. 
What they do say is that these results are possible, and no one can be sure that they will 
not be realized. We have not yet found that the views of experts on this question depend 
in any degree upon their politics or prejudices. They depend only, so far as our researches 
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have revealed, upon the extent of the particular expert’s knowledge. We have found that 
the men [and women] who know most are the most gloomy.  (Russell et al., 1955) 
 
9. A Long Tradition  
To summarize:  Climatologists and other scientists who are troubled by a sense of responsibility 
would do well to voluntarily think of themselves as bound by ethical constraints similar to those 
that guide the learned professions such as engineering and medicine.  The most relevant of these 
to the problem of reticence are the duty to decide, the duty to report, and the duty to inform.  The 
duty to decide is the inescapable need for professionals to make concrete decisions or 
recommendations in finite time, often without what Hansen (2007) called “the comfort of 
waiting for incontrovertible confirmations.”  The duties to inform and report require 
professionals to bypass chains of command and speak out to the public in clearest terms about 
matters of public interest.   
 I do not advocate the formal professionalization of climate science, much less scientific 
research in general (although it would be desirable to have better means by which scientists 
could be legally protected when they find a need to speak out in ways that may threaten vested 
interests).  There would be obvious practical impediments to the professionalization of research 
science, especially in the short time frame presented to us by the climate challenges we face 
today.  More important, there probably will always be talented research scientists who are 
indifferent or blind to the human implications of their work; nevertheless, society may benefit 
from their insights, perhaps crucially.  In the end, the most important qualifications for 
accreditation as a research scientist are and must remain ability and accomplishment in research.  
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Therefore, it could be counterproductive to formally professionalize climate science, let alone 
scientific research in general.   
The burden of this paper is to advocate that those scientists who are indeed troubled 
about the broader implications of their findings may find it helpful to train themselves to respond 
voluntarily like engineers or emergency room doctors in cases where there genuinely are 
reasonable grounds for a sense of urgency. The fact remains that presently scientists cannot (in 
general) be legally compelled to speak out to the extent that licensed professionals can.  Hence, 
the recommendation given by this paper is conditional:  if a research scientist wants to accept 
greater responsibility but is not sure how to square this with the need for scientific rigor, there 
does exist a long-established model that can be followed.  Scientists who prefer to not speak out 
publicly should, however, be warned that, like the scientists and public officials in the L’Aquila 
case (Ropeik, 2012; Torcello, 2014), they could find themselves liable anyway if they fail to 
warn of risks that only they may have been able to accurately assess.  As Ropeik (2012) explains, 
the seven scientists and officials were jailed not for failing to predict the earthquake that killed 
over 300 persons at L’Aquila, Italy, on April 9, 2009 — for it is well understood that it is 
generally difficult or impossible to predict the precise timing of major earthquakes — but for 
failing to communicate to the public the risk of a quake.  The convictions of six of the seven 
were eventually reversed (Rosen, 2014).  However, this is an area where legal precedent will 
likely evolve in the face of increasing climatic crisis, and the expectations that precedent places 
on scientists could increase as well.  Of course, today’s scientists will also face the judgement of 
history — as will those who fail to heed their warnings. 
  It may seem that I threaten to impose impossibly severe expectations on research 
scientists, whose jobs are difficult enough as it is.  My aim is to point out that there does exist a 
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well-established model which can provide guidance for those research scientists who do in fact 
feel a sense of social responsibility about the implications of their work and who are in fact 
troubled by the conflict that was mentioned at the beginning of this paper — that is, the conflict 
between the imperative to remain objective and disinterested in the conduct of scientific 
research, and the imperative to speak out in those cases where it would be unconscionable not to 
do so.  Such scientists may find it comforting and steadying, in these very uncertain times, to 
place themselves within the long and honourable tradition of professional practice.   
 
Acknowledgments 
This paper has benefitted from commentary by or discussions with Richard Alley, Bryson 
Brown, William Buschert, James Byrne, Maxim Chambers-Dumont, Hector MacIntyre, Frank 
Jankunis, Hester Jiskoot, Dan Johnson, Stephen Latta, Stephan Lewandowsky, Pamela Lindsay, 
Stefan Linquist, Michael E. Mann, David McDonald, John D. Milton, Mark Musk, M.D., Dillon 
St. Jean, Lawrence Torcello, Grant A. Whatmough, audiences at meetings of the Canadian 
Philosophical Association, the Western Canadian Philosophical Association, and the 2013 
Chapman Conference of the American Geophysical Union (on “Communicating Climate 
Science”), and anonymous referees for this journal.  Financial support was provided by the 
University of Lethbridge, under its CREDO (Community of Research Excellence Development 
Opportunities), Fund 13355.  It should not be presumed that any of the individuals or 
organizations mentioned here agree with the views expressed in this paper, and any errors or 
omissions are entirely the responsibility of its author.    





American Geophysical Union (AGU).  (2013a).  AGU Scientific Integrity and Professional Ethics.  
https://ethics.agu.org/. 
American Geophysical Union (AGU).  (2013b).  Chapman Conference on Climate Science 
Communication.  
https://www.youtube.com/playlist?list=PL7Ihm2Mh3MZ5ZVQhhGP8pGu85dj6ued__  
American College of Emergency Physicians. (2008). Code of ethics for emergency physicians. 
http://www.acep.org/Clinical---Practice-Management/Code-of-Ethics-for-Emergency-
Physicians/. 
American Medical Association (AMA). (2004). Opinion 9.07 - Medical Testimony. http://www.ama-
assn.org/ama/pub/physician-resources/medical-ethics/code-medical-ethics/opinion907.page . 
American Society of Civil Engineers (ASCE). (2006). Code of ethics. 
http://www.asce.org/uploadedFiles/About_ASCE/Ethics/Content_Pieces/CodeofEthics2006.pdf . 
Anderson, K. (2015). Duality in Climate Science. Nature Geoscience, 8, 898-900.  
Andrews, G. C., & Kemper, J. D. (1992). Canadian Professional Engineering:  Practice and Ethics. 
Toronto: Saunders. 
Anthony, S. (2012). CERN now 99.999999999% sure it has found the Higgs boson ExtremeTech. 
http://www.extremetech.com/extreme/143497-cern-now-99-999999999-sure-it-has-found-the-
higgs-boson . 
Bell, E. T. (1937). Men of Mathematics. New York: Simon and Schuster. 
Bennet, J., Brosz, H., Catania, J., Ellison, K., Maher, M., Porter, D., . . . Veerasammy, R. (2012). 
Guideline for professional engineers providing forensic engineering investigations. 
http://www.peo.on.ca/index.php/ci_id/28085/la_id/1.htm : Professional Engineers of Ontario. 
Betz, Eric.  (2017). Meltdown.  Discover, June 2017, 36-47. 
Biddle, J. B., & Leuschner, A. (2015).  Climate skepticism and the manufacture of doubt:  can dissent in 
science be epistemically detrimental?  European Journal for Philosophy of Science, 5, 261–278.  
doi:10.1007/s13194-014-0101-x    
Borenstein, S. (2013). What 95% certainty means to scientists. The Big Story.  Retrieved from 
http://bigstory.ap.org/article/what-95-certainty-warming-means-scientists  
Broecker, W. S., & Kunzig, R. (2008). Fixing Climate:  What Past Climate Changes Reveal About the 
Current Threat--and How to Counter It. New York: Hill and Wang. 
Brysse, K., Oreskes, N., O'Reilly, J., & Oppenheimer, M. (2013). Climate Change Prediction: Erring on 
the Side of Least Drama? Global Environmental Change, 23(1), 327-337.  
Castillo, M. (2010). The uncertainty of science and the science of uncertainty. American Journal of 
Neuroradiology, 31, 1767-1768. doi:10.3174/ajnr.A2106 
CBC Radio (2016).  Trump advisor wants to cut NASA climate change research, calls it 'politicized 
science'.  Interview with Robert Walker on As It Happens.  
http://www.cbc.ca/radio/asithappens/as-it-happens-wednesday-edition-1.3864045/trump-advisor-
wants-to-cut-nasa-climate-change-research-calls-it-politicized-science-1.3864051  
Chadwick, R. (2005).  Professional Ethics and the ‘good’ of science.  Interdisciplinary Science Reviews, 
30(3), 247–256.  
Chomsky, N. (1967). The Responsibility of Intellectuals. New York Review of Books.  
Page 33 of 36 
 
DeConto, Robert M., & Pollard, David (2016).  Contribution of Antarctica to past and future sea-level 
rise.  Nature, 531, 591.  doi:10.1038/nature17145 
Definition of Professional Misconduct; Ontario Regulation 538/84, Sect. 86,  (1990). 
Edwards, T. (2013, July 13). Climate Scientists Must Not Advocate Particular Policies, op-ed. The 
Guardian. Retrieved from http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0959378012001215  
Engineering Council, & Royal Academy of Engineering. (2014). Statement of ethical principles for the 
engineering profession. 
http://www.engc.org.uk/engcdocuments/internet/Website/Statement%20of%20Ethical%20Princip
les.pdf : Engineering Council. 
Favier, L., Durand, G., Cornford, S. L., Gudmundsson, G. H., Gagliardini, O., Gillet-Chaulet, F., . . . Le 
Brocq, A. M. (2014). Retreat of Pine Island Glacier controlled by marine ice-sheet instability. 
Nature Climate Change, 4, 117-121. doi:10.1038/nclimate2094 
Gerstein, M., & Ellsberg, M. (2008). Flirting With Disaster:  Why Accidents are Rarely Accidental. New 
York: Union Square Press. 
Goodell, J. (2017).  The Doomsday Glacier.  Rolling Stone, May 9, 2017.  
http://www.rollingstone.com/politics/features/the-doomsday-glacier-w481260 . 
Greenbaum, J. S., D.D. Blankenship, D. D., Young, D. A., Richter, T. G., Roberts, J. L., Aitken, A. R. A., 
. . . Siegert, M. J. (2015). Ocean access to a cavity beneath Totten Glacier in East Antarctica. 
Nature Geoscience. doi:10.1038/ngeo2388 
Hamilton, E., & Cairns, H.  (1961).  The Collected Dialogues of Plato.  Princeton:  Princeton University 
Press. 
Hansen, J., Sato, M., Russell, G., & Pushker, K. (2013). Climate sensitivity, sea level and atmospheric 
carbon dioxide. Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society A: Mathematical, Physical & 
Engineering Sciences, 371(2001), 20120294. doi:10.1098/rsta.2012.0294 
Hansen, J. E. (2007). Scientific reticence and sea level rise. Environmental Research Letters, 2, 1-6.  
Hansen, J. E., Kharecha, P., Sato, M., Masson-Delmotte, V., Ackerman, F., Beerling, D. J., . . . Zachos, J. 
C. (2013). Assessing ‘Dangerous Climate Change’:  Required Reduction of Carbon Emissions to 
Protect  Young People, Future Generations and Nature. PLOS One(December 3). 
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0081648 
Hansen, J. E., Sato, M., Hearty, P., Ruedy, R., Kelley, M., Masson-Delmotte, V., Russell, G., Tselioudis, 
G., Cao, J., Rignot, E., Velicogna, I., Tormey, B., Donovan, B.,Kandiano, E., von Schuckmann, 
K., Kharecha, P., Legrande, A.N., Bauer, M., & Lo, K. (2016).  Ice melt, sea level rise, and 
superstorms:  evidence from paleoclimate date, climate modeling, and modern observations that 
2° C warming could be dangerous.  Atmos. Chem. Phys, 13, 3761–3812. 
Harris, C. E., Jr. (1995). Explaining Disasters:  The Case for Preventive Ethics. IEEE Technology and 
Society Magazine (Summer 1995), 76-81.  
Hughes, T. (1977). West Antarctic Ice Streams. Reviews of Geophysics and Space Physics, 15(1), 1-46.  
Hume, D. (1751). An Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals. Indianapolis: Hackett (Reprint, 
1983). 
International Board of Forensic Engineering Sciences (IBFES). IBFES Code of Ethics and Rules of 
Professional Conduct. http://www.iifes.org/ethics.htm . 
IPCC. (2014). Climate Change 2014:  Synthesis Report Summary for Policymakers. 
https://www.ipcc.ch/index.htm . 
Page 34 of 36 
 
Jacobson, M. Z. & Delucchi, M. L. (2011). Providing all global energy with wind, water, and solar power, 
Part I: Technologies, energy resources, quantities and areas of infrastructure, and materials.  
Energy Policy, 39, 1154–1169; doi:10.1016/j.enpol.2010.11.040. 
Joughin, I., & Alley, R. (2011). Stability of the West Antarctic ice sheet in a warming world. Nature 
Geoscience, 4, 506-513. doi:10.1038/ngeo1194 
Joughin, I., Smith, B. E., & Brooke, M. (2014). Marine ice sheet collapse potentially underway for the 
Thwaites Glacier basin, West Antarctica. Science, 344, 735-738.  
Keith, D. (2013).  A Case for Climate Engineering.  Boston:  MIT Press. 
Kotcher, J.E., Myers, T.A., Vraga, E.K.,  Stenhouse, N., & Maibach, E.W.  (2017).  Does Engagement in 
Advocacy Hurt the Credibility of Scientists? Results from a Randomized National Survey 
Experiment.  Environmental Communication, 17(3), 415–429. 
Lewandkowsky, S., Oreskes, N., Risbey, J. S., & Newell, B. R. (2015). Seepage:  Climate change denial 
and its effect on the scientific community. Global Environmental Change, 33, 1-13.  
Lewandowsky, S., Risbey, J. S., Smithson, M., Newell, B. R., & Hunter, J. (2014). Scientific uncertainty 
and climate change: Part I. Uncertainty and unabated emissions. Climatic Change, 124, 21-37. 
doi:10.1007/s10584-014-1082-7 
Lindley, D. (2007). Uncertainty: Einstein, Heisenberg, Bohr, and the struggle for the soul of science. 
New York: Doubleday. 
Mann, M. E. (2012). The Hockey Stick and the Climate Wars:  Dispatches from the Front Lines. New 
York: Columbia University Press. 
Mann, M. E., Bradley, R. S., & Hughes, M. K. (1998).  Global-scale temperature patterns and climate 
forcing over the past six centuries.  Nature, 392, 779–787. 
Mann, M. E., & Toles, T.  (2016). The Madhouse Effect:  How Climate Change Denial is Threatening 
Our Planet, Destroying Our Politics, and Driving Us Crazy.  New York:  Columbia University 
Press.   
Martin, D. (2014).  Rick S. Piltz, Firebrand on Climate, Dies at 71.  New York Times, Oct. 24, 2014, A25.   
McKeon, R. (ed.).  (1941).  The Basic Works of Aristotle.  New York: Random House. 
Mercer, J. H. (1978). West Antarctic Ice Sheet and CO2 greenhouse effect:  a threat of disaster. Nature, 
271, 321-325.  
Oreskes, N. (2013). The Scientist as Sentinal. Limn, 3.  
Oreskes, N., & Conway, E. M. (2010).  Merchants of Doubt.  New York:  Bloomsbury.   
Peacock, K., & Shepherd, J. (1998). Knowledge versus opinion:  Two models of professionalism. Paper 
presented at the The Third Annual Laurier Conference on Business and Professional Ethics, 
Waterloo, ON. 
Pollard, D., M.DeConto, R., & B.Alley, R. (2015). Potential Antarctic Ice Sheet retreat driven by 
hydrofracturing and ice cliff failure. Earth and Planetary Science Letters, 412, 112-121. 
doi:10.1016/j.epsl2014.12.035 
Poortinga, W., Spence, A., Whitmarsh, L., Capstick, S., & Pidgeon, N.F. (2011).  Uncertain climate: An 
investigation into public scepticism about anthropogenic climate change.  Global Environmental 
Change, 21, 1015–1025.  doi:10.1016/j.gloenvcha.2011.03.001 
Powell, J. L. (2011). The Inquisition of Climate Science. New York: Columbia University Press. 
Professional Engineers of Ontario (PEO) (2010). A Professional Engineer's Duty to Report: Professional 
Engineers of Ontario. 
Page 35 of 36 
 
Rahmstorf, S. (2013). Sea-level rise: Where we stand at the start of 2013.  Retrieved from 
http://www.realclimate.org/index.php/archives/2013/01/sea-level-rise-where-we-stand-at-the-
start-of-2013/   
Rignot, E. (2014). Widespread, rapid grounding line retreat of Pine Island, Thwaites, Smith, and Kohler 
glaciers, West Antarctica, from 1992 to 2011. Geophysical Research Letters, 41(10), 3502-3509. 
doi:10.1002/2014gl060140 
Rignot, E.  (2015).  Interview.  https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=0nOZwCitHgg  
Risbey, J. S. (2008). The new climate discourse:  Alarmist or alarming? Global Environmental Change, 
18, 26-37.  
Ropeik, D. (2012, October 22). The L’Aquila Verdict: A Judgment Not against Science, but against a 
Failure of Science Communication.  Retrieved from http://blogs.scientificamerican.com/guest-
blog/the-laquila-verdict-a-judgment-not-against-science-but-against-a-failure-of-science-
communication/  
Rosen, J. (2014). Six of the L’Aquila Seven Acquitted in Appeal. Eos, 95(46), 418.  
Russell, B. & Einstein, A. (1955).  The Russell-Einstein Manifesto.  
https://pugwash.org/1955/07/09/statement-manifesto/  
Schindler, D.  (2017).  Facts Don’t Matter.  Alberta Views, July/August 2017, 36–40. 
Schmidt, Gavin.  (2013).  AGU Chapman Conference on Climate Science Communication.  
http://www.realclimate.org/index.php/archives/2013/07/agu-chapman-conference-on-climate-
science-communication/  
Schneider, S. H.  (1988).  The greenhouse effect and the U.S. summer of 1988:  Cause and effect or a 
media event?  Climatic Change, 13, 113–115. 
Shrader-Frechette, K. (1986).  The Conceptual Risks of Risk Assessment.  IEEE Technology and Society 
Magazine, 5(2); reprinted in Flores, A. (ed.), Ethics and Risk Management in Engineering.  New 
York, Lantham, 1989, pp. 73–90.   
Smolin, L. (2006). The Trouble With Physics:  The rise of String Theory, the fall of a science, and what 
comes next. Boston & New York: Houghton Mifflin. 
Taleb, N. N. (2010). The Black Swan:  The impact of the highly improbable (2nd ed.). New York: 
Random House. 
Torcello, L.  (2011).  The Ethics of Inquiry, Scientific Belief, and Public Discourse.  Public Affairs 
Quarterly, 25(3), 197–215. 
Torcello, L. (2014, 13 March 2014). Is misinformation about the climate criminally negligent?  Retrieved 
from http://blogs.scientificamerican.com/guest-blog/the-laquila-verdict-a-judgment-not-against-
science-but-against-a-failure-of-science-communication/ 
Torcello, L.  (2017).  Yes, I am a climate alarmist.  The Guardian, 27 April, 2017.  
https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2017/apr/29/climate-alarmist-global-warming-
crime-humanity  
UNFCCC (United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change).  (2015).  Text of Paris 
Agreement.  http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/2015/cop21/eng/l09r01.pdf  
Vaughn, D. G., & Arthern, R. (2007). Why Is It Hard to Predict the Future of Ice Sheets? Science, 315, 
1503-1504. doi:10.1126/science.1141111 
Weart, S. (2014).  The Discovery of Global Warming.  American Institute of Physics.  
https://www.aip.org/history/climate/index.htm  
Page 36 of 36 
 
Weertman, J. (1974). Stability of the junction of an ice sheet and an ice shelf. Journal of Glaciology, 13, 
3-11. 
World Bank (2007).  The Impact of Sea Level Rise on Developing Countries: A Comparative Analysis.  
http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/156401468136816684/pdf/wps4136.pdf   
 
 
